The Russians continue the process of creating the Leningrad Military District, within the framework of which they are deploying several motorized rifle divisions that have not previously been involved in hostilities against Ukraine – the 116th, 72nd, 74th and 86th.
In addition, the Kremlin is essentially conducting a mobilization deployment of Belarusian troops, which, in theory, can also be involved in the battles in the Baltic direction. Which, in turn, directly indicates that the Russian Federation may be preparing an attack on Latvia.
This perspective is outlined by the American think tank in its publication Jamestown Foundation, and this is a material worthy of special attention. The authors of this institution note, in particular, that Russian troops aimed at the Baltic countries are demonstrating the receipt of new weapons, in particular wheeled self-propelled guns “Malva” or North Korean artillery systems, which, in theory, are more needed by the ruscists on the battlefield in Ukraine.
In addition, during 2024-2025, Belarus suddenly intensified the process of restoring military infrastructure on the border with Latvia, in particular, began an audit of the weapons storage bases available there and held regular meetings of reservists.
All this looks like a “classic” concentration of forces on the main direction of the strike, in accordance with Russian military doctrine. However, then it is necessary to make an allowance for the fact that, based on the experience of the war against Ukraine, the Russian troops will advance not with a large “shock fist”, but with many “assault groups” that should “capillary seep” through the enemy’s defense lines (in this case, the armed forces of Latvia and possibly the troops of other countries).
If the Kremlin decides to attack Latvia, then most likely the main goal at the first stage of the war will be the capture of the cities of Daugavpils and Rezekne, and then, bypassing Eastern Latgale, the ruscists can go from Rezekne to Preili and eventually to Jelgava, relying on the local A6 highway and railway communications.
If such a plan is implemented, the Russian army will be able to enter the operational space to create an immediate threat to Riga as the capital of Latvia and all NATO communications in the Baltic region. In this case, Russian troops can recreate the logic of the Wehrmacht’s operation “Doppelkopf” and the Šiauliai operation of Soviet troops, both of which took place in the Baltic States in 1944 and provided for the logic of control, first of all, of transport communications, and only then the direct capture of large cities.
At the same time, the Russians may also pursue the goal of demonstrating the collapse of state power in Latvia, for which electronic warfare equipment and strikes on the country’s critical infrastructure can be used.
Based on The Military Balance 2024, the ground component of the Latvian Armed Forces numbered approximately 5.5 thousand people (including the National Guard), who had a total of 170 FV107 Scimitar and 34 XA-300 armored vehicles, 59 M109A5ÖE self-propelled guns, 53 81-mm and 120-mm mortars and 23 100-mm K-53 guns in storage. There was also evidence of the presence of three T-55s as training vehicles, in fact, currently the only tanks in the Baltic countries.
The air force component is 500 people, four An-2s and two UH-60 Black Hawks, short-range RBS 70 complexes and 40-mm L/70 Bofors anti-aircraft guns. The contingent of NATO troops was almost 2.5 thousand people, mainly from Canada (1000 people), Spain (600 people), Italy (370 people) and Poland (200 people).
