Abdullah Ocalan’s appeal to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party to disband and lay down its arms is not a breakthrough in solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey, although it may lead to it. However, this depends on the goodwill of all parties and their willingness to compromise.
The message of the PKK leader, who has been in a Turkish prison since 1999, was not surprising. Talks between the Kurdish delegation of Dem Parti (referring to his ideological leadership) and Turkish politicians and Ocalan himself have been going on for several months, and the PKK’s call for disarmament was expected as early as mid-February. The reactions to the appeal were also predictable and for the time being should not lead to excessive optimism, although this is an important and positive step. The problems, however, lie in the details.
Effects of the appeal
It is necessary to take into account not only political but also purely human aspects. Ocalan is currently 76 years old, 26 of which he spent in prison. In addition, he has been in isolation for the last few years. This obviously affects his perception, especially since he may have a choice between lifelong isolation and deterioration of prison conditions or transfer to house arrest with virtually unlimited contact with the outside world.
As for the latter option, although the Turkish authorities have not officially declared that it will be part of the agreement, such suggestions have been articulated by many politicians, including the leader of the nationalist MHP, Devlet Bahceli.
The analysis of the effects of Ocalan’s appeal should begin with indicating what he actually called for. The disarmament of the PKK and its self-dissolution were not the only topics discussed. Ocalan rightly pointed to the change in socio-political and legal circumstances as the reason for the loss of sense of the PKK’s continued existence. It was created in 1978, when the official narrative denied the existence of Kurds in Turkey, and the use of the Kurdish language or any expression of Kurdish identity was severely punished.
The mass persecution of the Kurds by the military regime of General Kenan Evren in the 1980s prompted the PKK to start an armed struggle. The aim of this organization was to create an independent Kurdish state in which Marxist-Leninist ideology would prevail. The PKK abandoned this in the 1990s, when the USSR, which had supported the PKK in the 1980s according to the logic of the Cold War, ceased to exist, and the countries of the “people’s democracy” rejected this form of political system. The PKK then adopted a new ideology, i.e. democratic confederalism, and stopped talking about an independent Kurdish state.
This issue is also clearly emphasized in Ocalan’s message. He states that “in the 1990s, with the collapse of real socialism due to its internal dynamics, the cessation of the policy of denying Kurdish identity and the improvement of freedom of speech, the fundamental importance of the PKK was weakened (…), which led to the need to dissolve it.”
The fact is that in the 1970s, 1980s and even 1990s, the Kurds did not have any opportunities to legally fight for their rights in Turkey, and this has changed significantly over the last 20 years. It is enough to point to the fact that Ocalan’s message was read out in Turkish and Kurdish and was broadcast by large screens set up in Kurdish areas. Meanwhile, in 1991, Kurdish MP Leyla Zana was imprisoned only for adding the words “I take this oath for brotherhood between Turks and Kurds” in Kurdish after taking the oath in parliament.
Ocalan, in his speech, also emphasized that “for over 1000 years, Turkish-Kurdish relations have been based on mutual cooperation and alliance.” More importantly, he rejected the “extreme nationalist deviations” in the form of a “Kurdish nation-state, federation, administrative autonomy, and culturalist arrangements” as “incompatible with the historical sociology of society.” Instead, he stressed the need to build a “democratic society” and create a “legal framework” for this.
Although the concept of a “democratic society” was presented by Ocalan in his 2005 “Manifesto of Democratic Civilization”, this postulate, in the context of “creating a legal framework”, remains quite vague and leaves a lot of room for interpretation. From the perspective of the Turkish government, however, it is very convenient that Ocalan ruled out the possibility of federalising Turkey or creating Kurdish autonomy within its borders. Especially the latter option would be unacceptable to Erdogan and Turkish society. The mention of “culturalist solutions” means that Ocalan also does not demand the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish ethnic identity as the second defining state nation next to the Turkish one Turkey. It is worth recalling that the breakdown of dialogue between the Turkish authorities led by Erdogan and Ocalan’s supporters from the HDP party led by Selahattin Demirtas in 2015 was related to an attempt to deconstruct the Turkish nation by reviving various ethnic identities and rejecting the possibility of supporting Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies.
Ocalan called for a PKK Congress to be convened for self-dissolution and for “all PKK groups” to lay down their arms, and his appeal was internationally acclaimed, by the Turkish authorities and by all apoist groups. It would seem, then, that since no one is against it, the matter is settled. Unfortunately, not necessarily, because everyone interprets (or declares a different interpretation) the content of this message in a different way. In this context, the attitude of the PKK field command, which is located in the Kandil Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan, is crucial. It is no secret that it was skeptical about the talks with their imprisoned leader, but on the other hand, it is not ready to try to undermine his authority in the apoist environment. For this reason, Kandil announced a unilateral ceasefire (reserving the right to self-defence in the event of an attack from Turkey) and announced its readiness to convene a congress, but on the condition that it would be led by Ocalan (which is rather out of the question at this stage). In addition, it decided that the ball is now in the court of the Turkish authorities, who should make appropriate legal changes in accordance with Ocalan’s call. This is therefore a skilful manoeuvre shifting the responsibility for the possible fiasco onto the Turkish authorities. The PKK will not disband and lay down its arms for the time being, but at the same time it will declare its readiness to comply with the call of its leader.
Turkish caution
However, the Turkish government has said that they have a completely different approach to Ocalan’s words, emphasising that the PKK and ‘all affiliated groups’ must now lay down their arms, and treat the rest of the PKK leader’s message as secondary elements (although there is information that there is a team working on legal changes). This does not mean that the aim of the whole process is only to bring about the disarmament of the PKK. It would be naïve of Erdogan to expect one statement from Ocalan to settle the matter.
The Turkish leader’s caution means that he does not participate in the talks, which means that he reserves the right to block the entire process if it does not meet his expectations. And apart from the liquidation of the PKK, there are two more issues at stake. The first is a constitutional amendment that would allow Erdogan to remain in power after the end of his current, theoretically last term. The introduction of enigmatic provisions about a “democratic society” could be a pretext for this, if it gains the support of the Dem Party in this matter. At the same time, the party is under pressure to remove elected mayors of cities under the pretext of ‘spreading terrorist propaganda’. In this way, m.in. Ahmet Turek was removed from the post of mayor of Mardin, which did not prevent him from leading the Dem Parti delegation in talks on the disarmament and self-liquidation of the PKK and the introduction of a “democratic society”.
The second issue concerns the neutralization of the Kurdish problem, not only in Turkey, but also in Iraq and Syria. The aim is to eliminate the anti-Turkish trend that could be used against Turkey (e.g. by Israel, Iran or the USA) and to dominate the Kurdish scene by pro-Turkish (read: pro-Erdogan) proxies, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of the Barzani family. Therefore, Turkey considered that the words “all affiliated groups” also refer to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which are the core of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, this interpretation was strongly rejected by the commander of this formation, General Mazlum Abdi, who also supported Ocalan’s appeal.
How will it end?
Does this mean that the process of settling the Kurdish issue and ending the PKK’s war with the Turkish state is doomed to failure? Also not necessarily. However, this requires bold steps and concessions on both sides. It should be emphasized that the majority of Turkish Kurds want it. They are aware that armed struggle is currently pointless, but at the same time they do not agree to the restriction of their rights, for example, through police terror against activists and the removal of elected representatives from their positions. They also want to guarantee their identity rights. And Turkey can guarantee this.
Moreover, it was a mistake that Ocalan’s message was read out, but he did not appear in person. The power of Ocalan’s message would be much stronger, whereso that he would withdraw from house arrest and conditions would be created for his virtual participation in the PKK congress. Of course, Kandil would not necessarily have to accept this (because one may have doubts whether peace is in the interest of the top leadership of the PKK), but it would be under much greater pressure.
There is also the issue of amnesty and reintegration of members of PKK military formations, which – so far – has not been discussed at all. For Turkey, it would be rather impossible to include the PKK leaders in political life, but it should at least guarantee their security. In addition, Turkey should abandon its thesis that Ocalan’s call also applies to the SDF and start direct talks with the leadership of this formation. Only then will this process have a chance of success, and Erdogan can also achieve his own goals related to the change of the constitution. At the same time, it can be expected that there will be forces on both sides that will want to torpedo such an agreement.
