If Western countries decide to organize an “air shield” mission or another format to protect the skies of Ukraine, then in this case they will need from 24 to 160 combat aircraft from the participating countries, not counting auxiliary aircraft, such as “air tankers” and AWACS aircraft.
The organization of such a mission can be an important step for the defense of our country, especially during a hypothetical peace process, but the question arises of how such an operation can be organized at all. The analytical center writes about this in its publication CSIS, located in Washington, D.C.
The authors of this center point out that European countries need direct assistance from the United States to organize such a mission, but it should also be borne in mind that the Americans may simply not provide the necessary assistance.
The methodology for calculating the number of aircraft needed for Ukraine’s “air shield” is as follows. The minimum figure of 24 fighters was taken from the practice of the NATO “air police” mission over the Baltic countries, within the framework of which the member countries of the Alliance involve up to four squadrons (or the same 24 aircraft).
This number of aircraft is just minimally enough to cover the 84-kilometer zone above the “Suwalki Corridor” and the 1000-kilometer-long border zone between the Baltic countries, Belarus and Russia.
But then the nuances begin, which relate to the issue of the real level of combat capability that a squad of forces should have within the framework of a possible mission of the “air police”.
For example, for the effect when it will be possible to simultaneously take 24 fighters into the air to patrol the territory of Ukraine, Western countries will need to allocate actually 48 aircraft, because the fleet readiness indicator in such missions is 50%.
If we further adjust for the fact that the territory of Ukraine is much larger than the total territory of the Baltic countries, and the level of air threats from Russia here is much higher than in the Baltic region, then the number of combat aircraft needed for the “air shield” mission immediately reaches 160 units. This is adjusted for the fact that such a mission should rather become an addition to Ukraine’s air defense, which will still bear the main burden of repelling the ruscists.
It is also indicated that “the organization of such a mission will significantly affect the life cycle of fighters in several European countries.”
Which, in fact, only exacerbates the question of how it will be possible to organize such a hypothetical “air shield” mission over Ukraine at all, especially if the United States does not participate in it.
